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The productivity  slowdown that has plagued  the U.S. economy 
since the early  1970's has increased  interest  in group incentive 
compensation  schemes such as profit  sharing and gainsharing, 
which might  improve productivity  by inducing workers  to work 
harder, by  lowering absenteeism  and quits, and encouraging 
workers  to share information  with management.  Interest in 
sharing also arose from the work of Martin Weitzman  (e.g., 
profit 
1983, 
1984), who  argued that an economy populated  by profit  sharing 
firms would exhibit greater employment  stability  than an economy 
in which  firms compensate  their workers by paying  a fixed wage. 
However,  the  hypotheses  that group incentives  enhance 
productivity  and that profit  sharing stabilizes  employment  have 
been criticized  by some economists. 
In this paper, our main objective  is to review some of the 
theoretical  and econometric  work on the effects of profit  sharing 
(PS) and gainsharing  (GS) on productivity  and the stability  of 
employment.' Prior to turning to our review, we discuss  some 
ambiguities  and problems  concerning what exactly is meant by 
profit  sharing and gainsharing  and then summarize  some indicators 
of the prevalence  of PS and GS in the U.S. and internationally. 
Ben-Ner  and Jones  (1991) develop  a conceptual  framework  to 
define  and differentiate  diverse  forms of employee  ownership. 
Their  framework  is  based  on  the  idea  that  ownership  of  an  asset 
is  commonly  viewed  in  the  legal  and  economics  literature  as  a 
'See  Kruse  (1993) for a review of previous work on these issues 
as well as the determinants  of the incidence  and adoption  of 
profit  sharing. bundle of rights to:  (i) financial or physical  returns  from the 
asset, and/or  (ii) control the use of the asset. They note that 
ownership  rights may be shared among different  agents and that 
ownership  arrangements  can be described  as combinations  of these 
two rights. When this conceptual  framework  is applied to PS and 
GS, by definition,  PS schemes are restricted  to the first type -- 
participation  in economic  returns'. That is, in PS plans  at least 
part of the compensation  for non-executive  employees  in an 
establishment  or company is dependent  on company performance. 
However beyond this basic  feature of PS there is still room  for 
disagreement  as  to  what  constitutes  "profit  sharing".  In 
particular  we  can  distinguish  between  a  broad  definition,  which 
does  not  require  a PS formula  (and  is  used  by  many,  e.g.  Kruse, 
1993),  and  a more restrictive  definition  of PS,  which does 
require  an explicit  formula  (and is also favored by many, 
including participants  at the International  Congress  on PS in 
1889).  Additionally,  the  profit  sharing  bonus  can  be  paid  as  cash 
or  deferred  by  being  placed  in  a pension  plan  trust  (or perhaps 
consist  of  both  a cash  payment  and  a deferred  contribution).  In 
practice,  there  are  noticeable  differences  in  schemes  that  are 
classified  as profit  sharing,  including  in some instances  plans 
in which  the bonus is independent  of the firm's profitability 
'However,  PS frequently  overlaps  or  coexists  or  is  even 
subordinate  to  other  institutional  arrangements  in  the  overall 
compensation  scheme,  especially  other  human  resource  management 
practices  (HFWPs)  that  provide  for  employee  participation  in 
control,  such  as  quality  circles  and  joint  consultation 
committees.  This  makes  for  great  difficulties  in  trying  to  get 
accurate  and  consistent  data  on  the  scope  and  extent  of  PS. 
2 (Kruse, 1993).3 
In contrast  to PS, gainsharing  plans often provide  for a 
modest  degree of participation  in control as well as for 
participation  in economic  returns.  Indeed in Scanlon Plans 
employee participation  is a central  feature. But in the other two 
main  forms of GS, Rucker and Improshare,  there is no set 
procedure  for participation,  though usual some form of 
participation  is an important  feature of the plan  (Cotton, 1993). 
With GS the focus is on improvements  in labor productivity 
(rather than profits)  and employees  share in the cost saving, 
typically  as a salary supplement  soon after the labor 
productivity  improvements  are determined.  Most GS plans  require 
an explicit  formula and plans usually operate plantwide  and 
include all hourly employees.  However,  differences  among GS 
schemes include:  (i) the scope of the group that is covered 
(normally all non-management  employees,  but possibly  restricted 
to a few groups);  (ii) the formula for cost sharing;  (iii) the 
specific  issues on which employees may make suggestions. 
We conclude this section by providing  some evidence  of the 
nature and prevalence  of PS and GS in the U.S. and around the 
globe. Since space restrictions  mean that we cannot provide  a 
comprehensive  survey, instead we concentrate  on those countries 
3For example, Kruse notes that the employer's  contribution  to 
some 401k pension plans depends only on the size of the 
employee's  contribution  to the plan. However,  these pensions 
plans are classified  as a deferred profit  sharing. 
3 about which most is known.4 
Several sources exist from which we can gauge the prevalence 
of profit  sharing in the U.S. Based on the Employee  Benefits 
Survey conducted  by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce',  the 
proportion  of firms with PS rose steadily  from 13% in 1955 and 
reached  22% by 1969. Since then it has remained between  20% and 
23%. For every year from 1979 through  1985, Hewitt Associates 
report the proportion  of the top 250 firms that adopted deferred 
forms of profit  sharing. Their figures are similar to those 
reported by the Chamber of Commerce.  Using a survey of small 
firms, Chelius and Smith  (1990) report that the proportion  of 
small firms with profit  sharing was 28% in 1987-- close to what 
the aforementioned  Chamber of Commerce  data report for the same 
year  (23%). For rapidly growing public  firms, Smith  (1988) 
reports a somewhat higher  figure --33% in 1984.  The main  survey 
which  records an incidence  of PS that is noticeably  higher was 
undertaken  by Mitchell,  Lewin and Lawler  (1990). They report that 
close to 40% of 500 responding  business  units had profit  sharing. 
However,  the low response  rate of 6.5% to this survey makes one 
suspicious  of the representativeness  of the sample. 
A recent study by Kruse  (1993) provides  information  on the 
4For more extensive  reports there are several recent surveys. 
These include: Uvalic  (1990), Perry and Kegley  (1990), Rosen, 
Dorso,  and Rothblatt  (1990), Ben-Ner  and Jones,  1991, and  Jones 
and Pliskin,  1994. 
5Since 1955, they have conducted  annual surveys and have used the 
survey responses  to calculate  the proportion  of firms that adopt 
broadly  defined profit  sharing including both cash and deferred 
plans. 
4 characteristics  of U.S. profit  sharing. For 253 public  firms with 
profit  sharing, Kruse  finds that typically  almost 80% of 
employees were covered by a PS plan.  Deferred  plans were most 
common  (50% of all plans),  followed by cash plans  (about 40% of 
plans) with the remaining  10% a combination  of the two types. 
In Canada, PS has also grown rapidly: whereas  in 1984 
bonuses  and profit  sharing amounted to 1.7 percent  of total 
payroll  costs, this figure rose to 3.1 percent  two years  later 
(Current Industrial Relations  Scene in Canada,  1988). However, 
much of this growth is explained by the growth of performance- 
based compensation  plans targeted primarily  towards  executives. 
Thus in 1985, whereas  for executives  24 percent  of compensation 
typically was in the form of contingent  incentives,  for other 
managers  the corresponding  figure was 8.5 percent  and for other 
employees  only 4 percent. 
Uvalic  (1990) has assembled  a considerable  body of relevant 
information  for firms in the European  Economic  Community.  This 
study suggested  that, while  in some countries  (Belgium, Spain, 
Portugal  and Greece) PS is only a marginal  phenomenon,  elsewhere 
it has assumed a significant  presence.  In both cash and deferred 
forms, PS seems to be most common in France: whereas  in 1971 
there were only 219 cash based PS schemes  (covering about  100000 
employees),  by 1988 there were  4,600 known plans covering  almost 
one million workers  (Uvalic, 1990, pp.82-93).  The role of PS 
increased  in France during the 1980's from about 3 percent  to 4.1 
percent  of average earnings. Most French  firm-s  that share profits 
5 with employees  are smaller and tend to be concentrated  in 
services and trade, and transport.  As with other forms of PS, the 
incidence  of deferred  PS is greatest  in France with  about 4.5 
million workers  covered in over  12,000 companies  in 1988. Under 
these plans the average employee  receives  an amount equal to 
about 3.5 percent  of wages. 
Spurred by various tax 
rapidly in the U.K. Whereas 
concessions,  PS has also grown 
in 1979 only 78 schemes of a deferred 
nature were recorded, by 1990 there were more than 7,000 such 
plans in operation  covering more than 2 million  employees  (Perry 
and Kegley,  1990). In other Western  European  countries  outside 
the EEC, the limited data suggest that the phenomenon  is not 
widespread  (see Jones,  1991, for Sweden). While this is 
apparently  the case in Eastern  Europe too, there is evidence  of 
recent growth  (Vaughan-Whitehead,  1994). 
The Japanese bonus system has long attracted  attention  as a 
form of profit  sharing.6 The 
World War, though the chief 
workers  in high 
the late 1950's 
employees,  both 
were introduced 
positions. 
system existed before the Second 
beneficiaries  were white collar 
The present  system was introduced  in 
and early  1960's.  Bonuses, payable  to regular 
blue and white  collar and in all job categories, 
as part of the postwar  system democratizing  the 
workplace  (Shirai, 1983). The system was actively  supported by 
trade unions. 
6As  we discuss  later, there is an ongoing debate over whether  the 
Japanese bonus payment  system is a form of profit  sharing or a 
disguised wage. 
6 Presently  the bonus system is extensive  and important  in 
Japan.  Fully  97% of firms that employ  30 or more employees  pay 
bonuses  twice a year to regular employees  (Ohashi, 1989 p. 451). 
For most workers,  bonuses  amount to at least one quarter of pay 
and on average a regular worker  receives bonuses  amounting  to 3.5 
months pay. Thus in firms with more than 30 workers,  both in 
general as well as in manufacturing,  the percent  of annual total 
cash earnings paid in bonuses  has ranged from 24%-26%  from 1981- 
87 (Hashimoto,  1990 p. 82).  Even in smaller establishments 
(between 30 and 99 employees)  over 20  % of a regular worker's 
total cash earnings was in the form of bonus payments  (Ohashi, 
1989 p. 452). Lastly,  in the aggregate,  total bonuses paid to 
employees  range from 42% to 76% of company profits  (Freeman and 
Weitzman,  21987 ~.170).~ 
However, while the use of 
universal,  only 24.6% of firms 
bonus payments  is virtually 
have a formal profit  sharing plan. 
For larger firms  (employing more than  1000) only  13% have a 
formal plan  (Ohashi, 1989 p. 453-54). 
While profit  sharing seems to be quite rare elsewhere, 
are important  exceptions.  Thus there is evidence that the 
there 
practice  of PS is deeply  rooted in other Asian  countries,  for 
example Korea and Singapore.  There are also important  examples  in 
less developed  countries.  Thus in rural industries  in China, it 
seems that about  13 percent of firms used a compensation  system 
7For a more extensive  discussion  of these and other points  see 
Jones and Kato in Vaughan-Whitehead,  1994. 
7 in which bonuses  or dividends  supplemented  fixed wages  (Byrd and 
Lin,  1990. p. 244). 
Turning to GS, the 1987 survey by the American  Productivity 
Center  (O'Dell and McAdams,  1987) found that the main  forms of 
GS--Rucker,  Scanlon and Improshare--  existed in about  13 percent 
of firms in the US. Two years  later the Hewitt Associates  (1989) 
survey revealed that  16 percent  of firms surveyed had GS. In both 
cases GS was found to be more prevalent  in manufacturing  than in 
service industries,  in larger than in smaller  firms, in the 
Midwest  and Northeast  (compared to other regions)  and in nonunion 
rather than in unionized  settings. About one in three plans 
includes  all employees.  Also there is evidence that the idea of 
GS is catching on with  larger firms in Canada  (Booth, 1987, and 
Mitchell  Lewin and Lawler,  1990). 
The available  evidence  indicates that GS appears to be 
practically  non-existent  outside of North America.  In view of the 
importance  of both GS and PS within North America,  the virtual 
absence of GS elsewhere  (especially in places where  PS is 
prevalent)  is most improbable.  It is more  likely that there is 
pronounced  underreporting.  This might be attributable  to a number 
of factors. For one thing, unlike with other types of HRMPs, 
especially  PS and employee  stock ownership,  there do not appear 
to be many advocacy organizations  for different  forms of GS. 
Also there does not appear to be any legislation  that promotes  or 
provides  fiscal incentives  for firms to adopt GS. In turn these 
considerations  would  lead to diminished  pressures  for both 
8 government  and private  sponsored  surveys of GS, thus helping  to 
account  for what may be substantial  llmeasurement  error". 
II.  THE PRODUCTIVITY  EFFECTS OF PROFIT  SHARING AND GAINSHARING 
Profit  sharing and gainsharing  are group incentives  whose 
effects on productivity  can be analyzed using the same notions 
that underlie  the analysis of other compensation  practices.  Much 
of the recent theoretical  work on compensation  focuses on how to 
motivate  a firm's employees  to work harder when it is difficult 
to monitor  their effort.  '  Compensation  practices  differ in their 
ability to induce greater effort and to lower absenteeism  and 
turnover,  in their effect on how workers  allocate  their time 
across different  tasks, and in their costs.  Moreover,  the 
effectiveness  of a practice  is likely to vary with  firm 
characteristics  such as size, the nature of the production 
process,  and its human resource management  policies,  which  helps 
explain the variety of compensation  policies  employed  across 
firms. For example, when workers  are unable to adjust their 
effort because  of the nature of the production  process  (e.g., 
machine-paced  production),  they would  likely be paid an hourly 
wage or a salary. 
Firm may use explicit  individual  incentives  such as piece 
rates, commissions,  and merit pay to motivate  their workers.  In 
addition,  compensation  may be linked to individual  performance 
'Many argue that larger firms and larger establishments  have 
greater difficulty  monitoring  their workers  (see, for example, 
Polachek  and Siebert,  1993). 
9 even when workers  receive hourly wages or salaries  (Polachek and 
Siebert,  1993). For example,  in some models,  efficiency  wages 
(payments to workers  that exceed their alternative  wages)  induce 
greater effort either by functioning  as a penalty  if the worker 
is dismissed  for shirking or by increasing  a worker's  loyalty to 
the firm. Similarly,  upward-sloping  wage-tenure  profiles  provide 
workers  with an incentive  not to shirk if workers'  marginal 
products  rise at a slower rate than their wages. A similar 
incentive  is provided  by pensions  that are not fully vested. 
Group incentives  such as profit  sharing and gainsharing  are 
often more  suitable than individual  incentives when measuring  an 
individual worker's  output is difficult  or when there is team 
production.  However,  group incentives  potentially  suffer from a 
free rider problem,  except when the group is very small.  A 
worker may not increase his or her effort because  the incentive 
bonus generated  by the additional  effort must be shared with the 
other workers  in the group, thereby diluting  the worker's 
incentive.  Since all workers  face the same decision  problem, 
they may all work at the same pace as they would  absent a group 
incentive  scheme, thus attempting  to free ride on the greater 
effort of the rest of the group. But if they all make this same 
decision,  the group incentive  scheme will have no effect on 
productivity. 
Although  each worker  has an incentive  to free ride, except 
when the group is small, group schemes may induce greater  effort 
either because  of llself-monitoringl'  arising  from increased 
10 loyalty to the firm or because of llhorizontalll  monitoring  of 
workers  by other workers.  But Lazear  (1991) and Kandel  and Lazear 
(1992) argue that horizontal  monitoring  and other forms of peer 
pressure  are unlikely  to arise except in small groups. Cooke 
(1994) notes that horizontal  monitoring  might be less effective 
in unionized  firms because  union members might be reluctant  to 
report shirking by other members  to management.  In contrast, 
Fitzroy  and Kraft  (1987) offer a more optimist  assessment  of the 
possibility  for peer pressure  to operate.  The likelihood  that 
peer pressure will emerge in medium  and large firms may depend on 
the firm's industrial  relations  style or corporate  culture;  as 
Weitzman  and Kruse  (1990) and Jones and Pliskin  (1991a) have 
argued,  firms in which  labor and management  cooperate  are more 
likely to realize productivity  gains from adopting profit 
sharing.  In particular,  participation  of workers  in decision 
making  is expected to increase the effectiveness  of profit 
sharingg. In addition,  the free rider problem of group incentive 
schemes is often diminished  in a repeated  game model  (Weitzman 
and Kruse  (1990), implying that profit  sharing and gainsharing 
may be more effective  if worker  turnover of workers  is low. 
In contrast to the free rider argument which  implies that 
productivity  should be the same in profit  sharing  firms and 
conventional  firms, Alchian  and Demsetz  (1972) argue that 
managerial  shirking that arises from managers  sharing profits 
'However, Jensen and Meckling  (1979) argue that the cost of 
monitoring  workers  increases  as the number of monitors  increases. 
11 with workers  may result in lower productivity  in profit  sharing 
firms than in conventional  firms. According  to Alchian  and 
Demsetz,  efficient monitoring  requires that the monitors  receive 
the firm's profits. However,  Bonin and Putterman  (1987) and 
Putter-man  and Skillman  (1988) point out that peer monitoring 
promoted  by various participatory  policies may be more effective 
than monitoring  by managers  in some instances. 
Profit  sharing firms may invest less than conventional  firms 
if owners receive only a fraction of the return on investment 
projects  (see, for example, Meade,  1986). However,  this 
proposition  assumes that it is not possible  to adjust the bonus 
to account  for the profits  generated by new equipment  and 
structures." 
Econometric  tests of the hypothesis  that profit  sharing" 
enhances  firm productivity  have primarily  relied on an augmented 
production  function  framework: output is assumed to be a function 
of labor, capital, various  firm characteristics,  and measures  of 
"Improshare  gainsharing  plans, which  share the cost reductions 
arising  from greater worker  effort equally between  owners  and 
workers,  allow owners to keep 90% of the cost savings that result 
from capital expenditures. 
"In part, space limitations  prevent  consideration  of the 
productivity  effects of gainsharing.  However, most studies have 
been case studies. While there has been some econometric  work 
(e-g., Kaufman,  1992), they are not based on the same augmented 
production  function  framework that has been used to study profit 
sharing.  In Kaufman's  case, this reflected  his inability  to 
obtain data on output and the capital stock for the firms who 
participated  in his survey. 
12 profit  sharing.'*  Econometric  issues that arise include the 
choice of appropriate  controls, measures  of key variables,  and 
the sample frame and the possible  simultaneity  of profit  sharing 
and output. 
First, profit  sharing may be adopted by firms with  superior 
management,  and the failure to control  for managerial  ability 
might  falsely attribute  to profit  sharing the effects of 
managerial  ability  (Wadhwani and Wall,  1990). Since data on 
managerial  ability is often unavailable,  a possible  remedy when 
the sample is panel data is to include firm specific  fixed 
effects to control  for differences  across firms in managerial 
ability insofar as they are constant over the time period  of the 
sample. 
Second, as noted above, the effects of profit  sharing on 
output  should depend on firm characteristics.  In particular, 
profit  sharing is more  likely to be effective when the firm is 
small so that the free rider problem  is less acute and peer 
pressure  is more  likely to operate, when the production  process 
is not machine-paced,  and when the firm has a corporate  culture 
characterized  by cooperation  between  labor and management, 
especially  including worker participation  in decision-making. 
One approach to capture these differences  is to interact the 
'*The  productivity  effect of profit  sharing is estimated  from the 
coefficients  on the profit  sharing variables.  However,  this is 
implicitly measuring  differences  in the levels of production  of 
profit  sharing and conventional  firms for common levels of 
employment  and capital  stock.  But, if profit  sharing  lowers 
investment,  profit  sharing firms will operate with a smaller 
capital  stock than conventional  firms. 
13 profit  sharing measure with indicators  of labor relations  and 
measures  of worker  participation,  employment  and perhaps  the 
firm's capital stock if the capital-labor  captures  important 
features of the firm's production  process.13  Alternatively,  it 
would be useful to examine  if the estimated  effects of profit 
sharing are robust when the production  functions  are estimated 
over samples stratified  by the relevant  firm characteristics 
(e.g., size). 
Third, profit  sharing is only one of the possible 
compensation  systems that firms may adopt.  Ideally, the 
econometric  specification  should account  for the use of piece 
rates, efficiency wage pay scales, employee  share purchase  plans, 
and other compensation  schemes. Moreover,  the use of these 
alternative  compensation  schemes makes the definition  of the 
productivity  gains of profit  sharing ambiguous:  Is the 
productivity  gain relative to a fixed wage scheme that does not 
have an efficiency wage or deferred  compensation  component  or 
relative to some other compensation  practice? 
Fourth, profit  sharing has been measured  by a dummy 
variable,  the proportion  of workers  covered, the average bonus 
per worker,  and the ratio of the bonus to wages or total 
compensation.  While measures  that capture differences  in the 
13Cable  and Wilson  (1989, 1990) and Jones and Pliskin  (1991b) 
estimated production  functions with these interaction  terms. 
Wadhwani  and Wall reported production  functions with the capital 
stock interacted with profit  sharing. Cooke  (1994) interacted  his 
measure  of group incentives  (profit sharing or gainsharing)  with 
a measure  of participation  (work teams) and with unionization. 
14 importance  of profit  sharing in pay would  seem to be preferred, 
they are more  likely to involve  simultaneity  bias than a profit 
sharing dummy variable  (see below).  Additionally,  it would be 
useful to investigate  how the effectiveness  of profit  sharing 
varies with characteristics  of the PS scheme such as whether  it 
is cash-based  or deferred  and perhaps  the age of the plan. 
Fifth, studies have used both sales and value added as 
measures  of output.  Clearly, the latter is more appropriate, 
especially  when the production  function does not include 
purchased  materials  as one of the inputs. 
Finally, most econometric  work assumes that the profit 
sharing variable  is predetermined.  If this assumption  is false, 
then the resulting  coefficient  estimates  are biased  and 
inconsistent  and the usual test procedures  are invalid.  We 
suspect that the simultaneity  bias is most serious when profit 
sharing is measured  by the ratio of the bonus to wage or by the 
average bonus per worker.  It is highly questionable  that the 
current bonus is determined  independently  of current output.  On 
the other hand, it may be justifiable  to regard a dummy variable 
indicating whether  or not the firm has profit  sharing as 
predetermined.  Clearly it would be useful to test the assumption 
that the profit  sharing measure  can legitimately  be treated  as 
predetermined  and to use an instrumental  variables  estimation 
procedure  when the test indicates  simultaneity  may be a problem. 
Of course, instrumental  variables  estimation  assumes that there 
are good instruments  available. 
15 Econometric  evidence overwhelmingly  favors the hypothesis 
that profit  sharing enhances productivity.14  Weitzman  and Kruse's 
(1990) review of econometric  studies found that the median 
increase  in productivity  is 4.4%  (based on the average  amounts of 
profit  sharing practiced  by the firms that offered profit 
sharing) with  50% of the estimates  falling in the interval  from 





identify under what conditions  profit  sharing would 
to offer large productivity  gains. We now briefly 
studies that provide  some evidence on possible 
Kruse  (1993) used a panel of 500 U.S. firms to examine how 
the effectiveness  of profit  sharing varied with characteristics 
of the plan. He reported that cash plans tend to enhance 
productivity  whereas  deferred plans do not, while the use of an 
explicit  formulae is found to have no bearing  on the productivity 
effects of profit  sharing. Weak forms of profit  sharing  (defined 
as the shared profit  constituting  less than 4% of total 
compensation)  do not improve productivity. 
The evidence  is mixed on the effects of firm size 
features of the firm's technology  on the effectiveness 
and 
of profit 
141t  is not clear whether  profit  sharing has a statistically 
significant  effect on profitability.  One difficulty  in 
determining  the effect on profitability  from studies based on 
estimated  production  functions  is that one has to assume or 
-estimate the effect of profit  sharing on labor compensation. 
"This review included  studies of worker  cooperatives  that 
examined how output varied with the degree that workers  shared in 
their cooperative's  surplus. 
16 sharing. The positive  productivity  effects of profit  sharing tend 
to be greater  for smaller firms according  to the results obtained 
by Kruse  (1993) for U.S. firms and by Jones and Pliskin  (1991b) 
for firms in the British  clothing industry,  thereby  confirming 
the view that the free rider problem  is less serious for smaller 
firms. However, Wadhwani  and Wall  (1990), Cable and Wilson  (1990, 
1991) and Jones and Pliskin  (1991b) for British  footwear  firms 
did not find that firm size was statistically  significant.16  The 
productivity  gains from profit  sharing were estimated  to vary 
inversely with the firm's capital intensity  for firms in the 
British  footwear industry  (Jones and Pliskin,  1991b).  In 
contrast, Wadhwani  and Wall  (1990) found that the output 
elasticity  of capital is increased by profit  sharing.  Capital 
intensity  did not significantly  affect the productivity  gains of 
profit  sharing in the samples used by Cable and Wilson  (1990, 
1991) and in the British clothing  industry. 
The proposition  that the productivity  effects of profit 
sharing are enhanced by worker participation  programs  has not 
received  strong empirical  support. Using meta-analysis  of 38 
published  studies, Doucouliagos  (1993) found that the association 
between  profit  sharing  (and individual  ownership)  is greater  in 
labor managed  firms than in more conventional  firms, which  is 
consistent  with worker participation  increasing  the productivity 
%able  and Wilson's  estimates  of the effect of firm size are not 
precisely  estimated  because  they interacted  their profit  sharing 
dummy variable with numerous  firm characteristics.  Jones and 
Pliskin  (1991b) results for British printing  firms was sensitive 
to the specification  estimated. 
17 gains from profit  sharing.  In contrast,  individual  econometric 
studies do not provide much support for the view that profit 
sharing and participation  are complementary.  Kruse  (1993) found 
no evidence  that human resource management  policies  alleged to 
ease the free rider problem  such as information  sharing and team 
production  reinforce  the productivity  effects of profit  sharing. 
We believe  that this last finding should be considered 
preliminary  because  of somewhat unsatisfactory  measures  of these 
policies17.  Cooke  (1994) estimated  that work teams increased  the 
effectiveness  of profit  sharing by a modest  amount in 
nonunionized  firms and reduced the effectiveness  in unionized 
firms." According  to Jones and Pliskin  (1991b), worker  directors 
did not enhance the effectiveness  of profit  sharing.  However, 
worker  representation  on the board of directors might be a poor 
proxy  for the sort of participation  that would  induce cooperation 
between workers  and management.  In addition,  the estimated 
productivity  effect of profit  sharing is greatest  in the footwear 
industry, which has more extensive  employee  representation  on the 
board of directors  than either the clothing  and printing 
industries.  This might  suggest that worker participation  enhances 
the effectiveness  of profit  sharing.  Alternatively,  the larger 
productivity  effects in the footwear industry  could reflect the 
17Morishima (1991) and Kleiner  and Bouillon  (1988) use more 
careful measures  of these policies.  However,  they did not 
examine the complementarily  of profit  sharing and these policies. 
"It is impossible  to determine  from Cooke's  reported  results  if 
these differences  are statistically  significant. 
18 relatively  small size and low capital intensity  of footwear 
firms. 
III.  PROFIT SHARING AND EMPLOYMENT  STABILITY 
The view that employment  fluctuations  might be moderated  by 
profit  sharing  (or any scheme that increased the flexibility  of 
compensation)  was advanced during the Great Depression  (Mitchell, 
Lewin, and Lawler,  1990 and George,  1993).  Since compensation 
would  respond more quickly to unanticipated  aggregate  demand or 
aggregate  supply shocks under profit  sharing than under a fixed 
wage system in which wages are set by long-term contracts,  a 
profit  sharing firm should exhibit  less employment  variability. 
Weitzman  (1983, 1984) extends the analysis of greater 
flexibility  of pay to a  'share economy'  in which most or all 
firms have adopted profit  sharing and contrasts  this economy to 
one consisting  of conventional  firms that do not adjust wages  in 
the short-run.  In a share economy in which  firms compensate 
workers  with both a base wage and a share of profits,  labor 
shortages may arise because  firms in the short-run will want to 
hire workers  to equate the value of the marginal  product  of labor 
to the base wage  (the marginal  cost of labor) rather than to 
total remuneration.  lg  If the base wage is set sufficiently  low, 
"By contrast,  in the long-run, profit  sharing firms will view 
total compensation  per employee  as the marginal  cost of hiring  an 
additional worker,  and consequently,  the long-run equilibrium  of 
a share economy will be identical  to that of a economy populated 
by conventional  firms, assuming profit  sharing affects neither 
productivity  nor investment. 
19 demand  for labor would  exceed the available  supply, which  is 
determined  by total remuneration.  Thus, profit  sharing  firms will 
often be characterized  by an excess demand  for labor, which 
implies that a negative  aggregate  demand  shock would  increase 
unemployment  in a share economy by a smaller amount than under a 
fixed wage system. A positive  demand  shock will yield the same 
employment  increase in the two systems if the shock occurs  at 
full employment,  while  a positive  demand  shock that reverses  the 
effects of a negative  demand shock  (i.e., a recovery) would 
induce a smaller employment  increase  in a share economy  (Kruse, 
1993). 
Weitzman's  theoretical  case for profit  sharing has been 
criticized  for its sensitivity  to a number of its assumptions, 
especially  whether  the base wage or total remuneration  is the 
marginal  cost of labor  (e.g., see Estrin, Grout, and Wadhwani, 
1987). If firms view total remuneration  as the marginal  cost of 
labor, perhaps because  of tight labor markets, Weitzman  's 
employment  effects will not arise.20 
A key assumption  underlying  the stability hypothesis  is that 
a worker's  pay varies with the firm's demand conditions.  Thus, 
the effects of deferred profit  sharing and cash plans  should be 
similar if the profit  sharing bonuses  are equally responsive  to 
20There  are a number of studies testing the validity  of the 
hypothesis  that in the short-run,  the firm does not regard the 
profits  distributed  to workers  to be part of the marginal  cost of 
labor. See, for instance, Kruse  (1993) for the U.S. and Freeman 
and Weitzman  (1987), Brunello  (1991), and Ohashi  (1989) for 
Japan. 
20 variations  in the firm's profitability. 
To test the stability  hypothesis,  researchers  need to 
investigate  if profit  sharing firms respond differently  to shocks 
than conventional  firms. Additionally,  it is useful to examine 
separately  the employment  changes induced by positive  and 
negative  demand  shocks. The magnitude  of the employment  changes 
should depend on the size of the shocks, the degree of 
flexibility  of employee  compensation,  and the proportion  of 
workers  whose pay is flexible.  In addition,  a test of Weitzman's 
share economy hypothesis  would  ideally be based on identifying 
firms with an excess demand  for labor because  these are the firms 
which  should exhibit the weakest  response to declines  in 
demand.21  One difficulty  is selecting  an appropriate  indicator 
of the demand  shocks facing the firm.  Both aggregate  (economy- 
wide or industry-specific)  and firm-specific  measures  have been 
used as proxies.  The use of a firm-specific  measure  such as sales 
or value added might yield misleading  results insofar as profit 
sharing also stabilizes  output as well as employment  (Kruse, 
1993). The use of economy-wide  measures  such as the unemployment 
rate or GDP  (or GNP) requires an assumption  that firms in 
different  industries  respond identically  to changes in the 
measure  after controlling  for the profit  sharing status of the 
firm. Perhaps  an indicator of industry output is best; however  it 
21See  Kruse  (1993) for an attempt to test the stability  hypothesis 
using estimates  of firm's excess demand  for labor. The results 
from this study that we report below are based on a simpler 
specification  that are based on these excess demand estimates. 
21 is useful to examine  if findings on the employment  stability 
hypothesis  are sensitive to the demand  shock proxy.  It is 
expected that employment  stability  should vary with the degree of 
flexibility  of employee  compensation.  Finally,  if a substantial 
fraction of a firm's workforce  is not covered by a PS scheme, PS 
firms might behave  like conventional  firms and layoff workers 
whose pay is rigid.  This concern is especially  important  if the 
workers who are not covered by profit  sharing are those with  less 
seniority  or otherwise more  likely to lose their  jobs in 
difficult  times. 
The view that profit  sharing stabilizes  employment  has 
received  considerably  weaker  support in econometric  studies than 
the positive  findings on the productivity  enhancing  effects of 
profit  sharing. Moreover,  a comparison  of previous  work  is 
hindered because  these studies have implicitly  examined three 
distinct  stability hypotheses.  The one that seems closer in 
spirit to the theory we just summarized  is that the response  of 
employment  to demand shocks is weaker  in profit  sharing  firms 
than in conventional  fixed wage firms.22  The second and third 
stability  hypotheses  are that after controlling  for the effects 
of demand  (and other factors) on employment,  profit  sharing  firms 
22This  hypothesis  is examined using an employment  equation  (or a 
change in employment  equation) which  includes measures  of 
negative  and positive  demand shocks and these measures  interacted 
with the "profit sharing" variable.  If profit  sharing  firms 
respond to negative  shocks differently  than conventional  firms, 
the coefficient  on the interaction  term involving  the PS variable 
and the negative  demand shock measure would be statistically 
significant. 
22 are characterized  by more stable employment  (second hypothesis) 
and experience  faster employment  growth  (third hypothesis). 
The first hypothesis  was tested by Kruse  (1991, 1993) and by 
Wadhwani  and Wall  (1990).  Kruse provided  some evidence  that the 
response of employment  to negative demand  shocks is weaker  in 
profit  sharing firms. Kruse  (1991) found that profit  sharing 
firms in the manufacturing  sector exhibited  a statistically 
weaker  response  to negative  aggregate demand  shocks  (proxied by 
measures  based on the U.S. unemployment  rate, GDP, or industry 
shipments)  than other firms in the manufacturing  sector when the 
proportion  of employees who participated  in the firm's largest PS 
plan is used as the measure  of profit  sharing.  (When profit 
sharing is captured by a dummy variable,  the stability  hypothesis 
is supported  only when GDP is used to proxy a negative  demand 
shock.) There is no statistically  significant  difference  between 
PS firms and other firms in the manufacturing  sector for positive 
demand  shocks and for nonmanufacturing  firms for both demand 
shocks. Kruse  (1993) found that firms that adopted profit  sharing 
during his sample period  adjusted their employment  to a decline 
in GNP less than conventional  firms."  However,  firms that had 
adopted profit  sharing prior to the start of the sample did not 
differ  significantly  than conventional  firms in their response  to 
demand  shocks. Also, Kruse did not detect a statistically 
significant  difference  between  conventional  firms and profit 
23Kruse  limited his sample of profit  sharing firms to those that 
covered at least 90% of their workers.  Thus, a reduction  in 
employment would  likely include workers whose pay is flexible. 
23 sharing firms when  firm sales was used to measure  demand  shocks 
and for positive  demand  shocks.  In contrast to Kruse, Wadhwani 
and Wall  (1990) found that profit  sharing firms did not exhibit 
different  response  to aggregate  demand  shocks  (proxied by 
industry output) than conventional  firms. 
a 
The second employment  stability hypothesis  was examined by 
Bell and Neumark  (1993), who regressed  the absolute value of the 
residuals  from an employment  growth equation on a profit  sharing 
dummy variable  and other controls.  This is equivalent  to 
examining  if the standard deviation  of the disturbance  term of 
the employment  growth equation depends on the profit  sharing 
status of the firm. While their estimated  coefficients  on the PS 
dummy variable  are negative,  none is statistically  significant 
(the t statistics  are "near one1t).24 
Finally,  Chelius and Smith  (1990) found that among small 
firms that experienced  a decline  in sales, profit  sharing  firms 
were estimated  to have experienced  a 4% smaller  fall in 
employment  than conventional  firms after controlling  for the 
decline  in sales, the change in wages,  and other firm 
characteristics.  The estimated  drop in employment  is independent 
of the size of the firm's sales decline, which  is why we consider 
their result to be a test of the third stability hypothesis 
rather than the first. 
24The  hypothesis  tests are not strictly valid since Bell and 
Neumark  did not correct  for heteroskedasticity  in the regression 
involving  the absolute value of the residuals. 
24 IV.  CONCLUSION 
Our partial  survey of recent econometric  work on the effects 
of profit  sharing and gainsharing  indicates  that these 
alternative  forms of labor compensation  often affect the economic 
performance  of firms. However, we sometimes  find that studies 
obtained  conflicting  results.  In part this reflects the diversity 
of alternative  sharing arrangements  for PS and GS. But also, 
without  careful planning,  studies will be likely to suffer  from 
selection bias, inappropriate  sampling  frames, inability  to 
control  for unobservable  firm heterogeneity  in the absence of 
sufficiently  long panel data sets, and measurement  problems. 
In view of the several shortcomings  of the available 
evidence,  trying to derive definitive  conclusions  on effects  of 
PS and GS on productivity  and employment  stability  from this work 
is a hazardous  undertaking.  Clearly more research on these issues 
is needed. Moreover,  particular  results often depend on the 
specific characteristics  of the particular  scheme as well as firm 
characteristics.  Thus there is some evidence  that the 
productivity  effects of profit  sharing are greater  in small firms 
and when the scheme is cash-based  rather than deferred.  Although 
individual  econometric  studies provide only weak  support  for the 
view that profit  sharing  schemes have a stronger impact when they 
are accompanied  by provisions  for some employee  involvement,  a 
meta-analysis  of published  studies suggests that profit  sharing 
and worker  participation  are complementary. 
In addition,  there are other important  areas where  there has 
25 been even less econometric  work.  These include the issue of the 
determinants  of the incidence  and adoption of different  forms of 
PS and GS  (e.g., Kruse,  1993 and Jones and Pliskin,  1994), the 
survivability  of PS schemes  (e.g., Hatton,  1988), and the effect 
of PS on investment  (e.g., Estrin and Jones,  1992). 
In designing  future applied work,  care must be taken to 
respond to the aforementioned  shortcomings  of many existing 
studies.  In addition,  recent studies  (e.g., Nuti,  1993, Levine 
and Tyson,  1990) have indicated  that aspects of the economic 
environment  within which  firms operate are of crucial  importance 
for the design and economic  effectiveness  of different  human 
resource management  practices.  Consequently,  and perhaps 
especially  in cross-national  studies, ways must be found to be 
capture differences  in the economic  environment.  Finally,  a 
potentially  most useful approach,  especially  in helping  to 
isolate the characteristics  of successful versus  unsuccessful 
forms of HFWPs are laboratory  experimental  methods.25 
25For  example,  see the work of Cooper et al  (1992) and Frohlich 
and Oppenheimer  (1990). Their work points to the importance  of 
fairness  and participation  in the design of successful  programs. 
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